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Dynamics of the Serbian EU accession 
process – key issues and the 
challenges of state democratisation  
in an era of populism
Abstract: The current Serbian authorities (aligned with the Serbian Progres-
sive Party) have pushed Serbia towards effective reforms over the past several 
years and improved its image on the international arena through an intensi-
fied diplomatic offensive after 2015. This has led to a situation in which the 
Serbian state became a political and economic partner in both regional and 
integration projects. The latter is demonstrated by the arduous but progres-
sive accession process to the European Union.
After 2000, international and Serbian public opinion greeting the end of the 
regime of Slobodan Milošević expected rapid democratisation of the state 
based on statements by Serbian politicians who had declared a West Euro-
pean course of the state. The short-lived rule of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, 
confirmed this; however, the policy of his successors was no longer so un-
ambiguous. For almost a decade, Serbia oscillated between populism and 
declared democratisation, without making major changes, expected by both 
society and the European Union.
When after the year 2012 the Serbian Progressive Party came to power (the 
party was founded as a conservative grouping and had radical roots), it 
seemed that the Serbian state would be pushed towards a more conserva-
tive, anti-European and nationalist direction. However, that did not happen. 
Opinion about the last six years of the group’s rule is varied. This paper aims 
to try to answer the question whether during the party’s rule, Serbia has been 
democratising and whether in this era of nationalist movements and pop-
ulism, the country has a chance at real democratisation and finishing the pro-
cess of accession to the EU?
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1. IntroductionOver several years, the current Serbian government (Serbian 
Progressive Party, Srpska napredna stranka, SNS) has pushed Serbia 
toward effective reform, improved its image on the international are-
na, and elevated the country to the status of a political and economic 
partner in both regional and integration politics, as evidenced by the 
hard but slowly advancing EU accession process. From a foreign per-
spective, in the 2010s, Serbia has decided to bet on young politicians, 
disavowing any links to the authorities of the 1990s, and steering the 
nation on a pro-Western and democratic course that in the first dec-
ade of the century had been limited only to verbal declarations. Apart 
from the term of the former Serbian Prime Minister (2001-2003) Zoran 
Đinđić, cut short by his assassination, the first decade was a festival 
of hollow promises and declarations made by governments unable 
to usher in any real reforms that would also be seen and felt by the 
common citizen, who had hoped for an efficient state based on the 
European model (meaning the EU as a desirable standard) ever since 
the collapse of the former Yugoslavia (FRY). For nearly a decade, Ser-
bia oscillated between declarative democratisation and de facto pop-
ulism, failing to introduce the reforms expected either by its society 
or the EU. In 2012, with the accession to power of the SNS, which ran 
on an essentially conservative and radical ticket, it seemed that the 
state would be propelled on an even more conservative, nationalist 
and anti-European path. However, this is not what happened. In con-
trast to the conservative President Tomislav Nikolić, the new, young 
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić appeared ready to push forward im-
portant reforms and democratise the country, even though his image 
makeover was quite radical. In the 1990s, he had earned a reputation 
as a ‘national firebrand’: in his capacity as the Minister of Information 
in the government of Slobodan Milošević, he helped introduce penal-
ties for dissident journalists and initiated a block on foreign TV chan-
nels, which marked him out as a persona non grata in the EU (in 2014, 
he even issued an apology for these actions)1. Following the 2012 elec-
tions, however, he rebranded himself as an ‘occidentalist’ while main-
1 Srpska napredna stranka, I’m obsessed with Kosovo, 15.05.2018, https://www.sns.org.rs/en/novo-
sti/vesti/vucic-im-obsessed-kosovo [11.10.2019].
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taining very good relations with Russia, he began to tighten the alliance 
with the EU and successfully opened up the Serbian market to foreign 
investment. Thanks to these moves, the power of Vučić, now as the 
president of Serbia (since 2017), has relied, as his critics emphasize, on 
the support granted by Western powers in recognition of his role in 
the service of global capital and Western interests. Such policies, and 
the trust vested in Vučić by the West, achieved by the Serbian diplo-
matic offensive since 2015, have allowed the president and his team to 
quickly consolidate their power and win a majority in earlier parlia-
mentary elections. As a result, the ruling party and its leader no longer 
need coalition support to introduce the reforms that suit them. This 
power consolidation has led some to liken Vučić to Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, based on similarities in their political system 
reforms and the way in which they are introduced. According to the 
latest Freedom House report, Serbia is now labelled as ‘partly free’; 
no more than a year ago, with seven more points, it was still classified 
as ‘free’. The greatest score loss was reported in political rights, civil 
liberties, and media freedom2.
Long perceived as a country with a third-world mentality, plagued 
by the post-conflict syndrome, Serbia has quickly revamped its im-
age to seriously consider taking on the role of regional hegemon, to 
which it has always aspired. The goal of the incumbent government 
is to finalise the accession process and join the EU, which, at least in 
the region, is treated as a clean bill of health, a sign of a well-devel-
oped economy, international trust and an equal political footing with 
other EU member states. This can be a big challenge for the Serbian 
authorities because of the political, social, and economic situation, 
which is not conducive to further enlargement of the EU. We could 
note the economic slowdown and the Union’s internal problems re-
lated to Brexit and the consequences of Catalan separatism. Critical 
assessment of the effects of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
perceived as countries admitted too early to the EU, also plays a huge 
2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2019/serbia [13.10.2019]; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, https://freedom-
house.org/report/freedom-world/ freedom-world-2018 [13.10.2019]; O. Karabeg, Da li će Vučić 
vladati Srbojom dokle bude hteo, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06.08.2017, https://www.slobodnaev-
ropa.org/a/da-li-ce-vudic-vladati-srbijom-dokle-bude-hteo/28660615.html [13.10.2019].
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role here. In addition, the refugee crisis in which Serbia played an im-
portant role, which was appreciated by the EU, led to the situation in 
which the European Union still focus on its own internal problems. 
On the other hand, EU politicians have clearly expressed anxiety about 
the continued of political and military strong ties (also important eco-
nomic in nature) with Russia.
The purpose of this paper to analyse the actions of the current Ser-
bian government which, on the one hand, aims to finalise the EU acces-
sion process, and on the other, curtails democracy inside the country, 
as well as to investigate the spaces of possibility for the democrati-
sation of state structures and internal policy in the era of consumer-
ist populism characteristic of the 2010s. The analysis will present the 
policies of the Serbian authorities and their EU accession milestones, 
as discussed in detail in the reports by the European Commission or 
Delegation. The activities of social movements and non-governmen-
tal organisations, on the other hand, will be shown based on texts 
penned by independent journalists and academics, as well as articles 
from selected media.
2. The path toward democratisation and Europeanisation of the state after 2000
No important measures to build relations with the EU in the post-
communist period were taken until the beginning of the 21st century, 
owing to the international isolation of the FRY in the 1990s and the 
armed conflicts that erupted in the wake of the break-up of the state, 
in which the West firmly took the side of the Serbian antagonists. Even 
though the most recent conflict broke out in 1999 (the Kosovo War), 
a pro-Western political course was adopted after the regime change 
of 2000; this met with an ambivalent response from Serbian society, 
which, on account of the international relations in preceding years but 
also its history at large, was more naturally inclined to look for political 
allies in the East (particularly in the Russian Federation). As indicated 
by contemporary opinion polls, however, although they accused the 
West of cynical and self-serving policies, Serbs expressed a marked 
preference for the Western lifestyle over that of the average Russian. 
Steering the country on a pro-Western course looked like the only 
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prospect for effective democratisation and modernisation, achievable 
through close cooperation with highly developed EU member states3.
The new Serbian government (still within the framework of the 
FRY) did not immediately win the trust of the Western powers, or 
Russia, despite its unequivocally pro-Western prime minister, Đinđić, 
and the quick EU accession plan promoted by Belgrade. Despite this 
international scepticism, however, a few days after the political change 
in Serbia (5 October 2000), the new president of the FRY, Vojislav 
Koštunica, was invited to attend the EU summit on October 8, 2000, 
in Biarritz, presided over by France, and Serbia was included in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process for Western Balkans, launched 
in June 19994. In 2000, the EU lifted tariffs on goods from the FRY, 
but the slow pace of reforms and unresolved war issues meant that 
Serbia would only sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the EU at the end of April 2008, effective as of the sec-
ond half of 2013.
Established in 2002 by the Government of the Republic of Ser-
bia, the European Integration Office regularly monitored public atti-
tudes toward EU accession. On the one hand, the EU was perceived as 
a promise of a better life for the common citizen; on the other, how-
ever, its image was tainted by European involvement in the resolution 
of the crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The resulting lack of consensus 
meant that work in Serbia’s parliament, the Skupština, would often run 
into periods of standstill and talks with Brussels constantly teetered 
on the verge of collapse. More often than not, the integration process 
failed to win a parliamentary majority, as evidenced by the resolution 
on association with the EU, passed only in October 2004, which de-
fined EU accession as a fundamental strategic and state interest, and 
was backed by just 129 of the 250 deputies5.
3 Conditions imposed by the EU, which contributed to the slowdown of the accession process, 
meant that a few years later, as an alternative, the concept of cooperation with the BRICS coun-
tries appeared, naturally alongside the Russian Federation. For more, see M. Korzeniewska-
-Wiszniewska, Charakter współczesnych relacji serbsko-rosyjskich, [in:] I. Stawowy-Kawka (ed.), 
Międzycywilizacyjny dialog w świecie słowiańskim w XX i XXI wieku. Historia – religia – kultura – 
polityka, Kraków 2012.
4 Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Istorijat odnosa Srbije i EU, http://www.mei.
gov.rs/srl/srbija-i-eu/istorijat-odnosa-srbije-i-eu/ [09.10.2019].
5 Z. Vučković, Transformacje systemu społeczno-politycznego w Serbii po 2000 r., Kraków 2014 [Doc-
torate not published. Access courtesy of the author].
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In the nearly two decades since 2000, the lowest level of support for 
EU accession (a little over 50 percent in favour and 30 percent against) 
was reported between 2010 and the end of 2014. In 2015, the figure 
began to grow and rose to nearly 59 percent in a Gallup poll (55 per-
cent declared they would vote in favour); at the same time, however, 
66 percent of respondents refused to recognise the independence of 
Kosovo, even as a prerequisite for accession, although 58 percent did 
support further talks between Belgrade and Priština. According to 
public opinion, other conditions that would have to be met before Ser-
bia could join the EU also included fighting corruption and organised 
crime and promoting economic stabilisation. Of Serbs, 57 percent ex-
pected to see Serbia in the EU within the next 10 years6.
It must be noted that the organisation of the state, which, from 
February 2003 onward, functioned as Serbia and Montenegro, also 
complicated potential negotiations, because of the problem of sepa-
rate markets. A referendum to decide the independence of Monte-
negro was scheduled for 2006; in light of its uncertain outcome, the 
talks came up against an additional stumbling block. Nevertheless, in 
2005, both republics were deemed ready to finalise negotiations on the 
SAA, which Serbia later signed as a sovereign and independent state7. 
Considerable advances in the integration of Serbia with Western Eu-
rope (such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement, CEFTA, 
or visa-free travel), however, came to a temporary halt in 2006 and 
2007 when Serbia was criticised for its inadequate cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
at The Hague. A formal application for EU membership was only filed 
at the end of 2009, with official candidate status being granted in early 
March 2012. The decision to start accession talks followed on June 28, 
2013, and in January 2014 the negotiations finally kicked off. Out of 
the 35 negotiation chapters on the agenda, as of October 2019, 17 had 
6 Ibidem.
7 Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Istorijat odnosa Srbije…; Ministarstvo za 
evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Споразум о стабилизацији и придруживању између 
Европских заједница и њихових држава чланица, са једне стране, и Републике Србије, са 
друге стране [Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između Evropskih zajednica  i njihovih država 
članica, sa jedne strane, i Republike Srbije, sa druge strane], http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/docu-
ments/sporazumi_sa_eu/ssp_prevod_sa_anexima.pdf [09.10.2019].
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been opened and two temporarily closed (10 intergovernmental con-
ferences have been held to date)8.
3. Key challenges and obstacles to the Serbian state  in the first decade of the 21st century
Regarding the efforts of Serbia to change after the Milošević period 
and expecting quick accession to the EU by Serbian society, we can 
notice a few specific elements that the country has had to face. More-
over, these were elements of special concern to the EU: cooperation 
with the ICTY (and handing over to the tribunal persons suspected 
of committing crimes during the wars), finding a solution to the situa-
tion of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo after the war in 1999, 
and developing regional cooperation.
Cooperation with The Hague tribunal was one of several precondi-
tions for starting accession talks with the Serbian state. Another pre-
requisite, equally controversial for the Serbian public, had to do with 
the regulation of relations with the state of Kosovo. The documents 
initially formulated it as a call for stabilisation through bilateral dia-
logue under the auspices of Brussels. The condition, however, soon 
came to be interpreted more broadly as a call for Belgrade to recog-
nise the independence of Kosovo; though never explicitly expressed 
in any document, it began to come up in the statements of politicians 
who visited Serbia in the 2010s, and especially those of German del-
egates, who made it clear that this was the ultimate objective of the 
support for the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. Such pro-
nouncements were and continue to be made openly, leaving no doubt 
as to the nature of the demand. The need to regulate relations with 
Priština was first brought up in 2011, during a visit of a Bundestag 
delegation to Belgrade when the German deputies clearly stated that 
Serbia could not join the EU before it recognised the independence of 
Kosovo. Their words were echoed by European Commissioner Stefan 
Füle, who commented that even though this was not a precondition 
for further Serbian integration with the Union, no EU state was pre-
pared to accept a new member with any unresolved issues in relation 
8 Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Istorijat odnosa Srbije…
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to its neighbours. Contacts between Serbia and Kosovo were thus ini-
tiated at the beginning of 2011. In late February and early March 2011, 
the two countries embarked on a series of talks designed to regulate 
issues of most pressing urgency for the residents of Kosovo, which re-
quired the participation of Belgrade, such as birth and land registers, 
cadastral records, air traffic, telecommunications, tariff stamps, and 
CEFTA membership. In July 2011, the National Agency for Regional 
Development in Serbia and the Agency for the Support of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in Kosovo signed an agreement to estab-
lish a joint institution that would be active on the territories of both 
countries. On and off, the talks have continued to this day. The most 
important issue currently on the agenda concerns plans for enabling 
the activities of the Community of Serb Municipalities, based on an 
agreement between Belgrade and Priština, which are rejected by the 
Albanian side due to the argument that it would create de facto Ser-
bian autonomy and could lead to the secession of Serbian-inhabited 
parts of the country9.
Apart from the issue of Kosovo, other external relations that play 
a vital role in the accession process from the perspective of Brussels 
include regional cooperation. Fostering good neighbourly relations 
is a challenge pursued on two levels, economic and political; in what 
follows, I will focus on the latter. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia, the 
economic sphere in the region has experienced unimpeded growth. 
Even though partnerships were primarily struck up with highly de-
veloped countries, which offered more competitive goods and sup-
ported the development of individual countries, former Yugoslavian 
republics also forged links of intense mutual cooperation in different 
economic areas. This was because of not only the prior links between 
the different regions within socialist Yugoslavia but also the situation 
after its collapse when businesses were broken up by the rise of new 
9 Z. Vučković, op. cit., passim; Kosovo Progress Essential, Fule Tells Serbia, Balkan Insight, 16.02.2012, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2012/02/16/progress-in-kosovo-dispute-remains-condition/ 
[07.10.2019]; Fule: Ne tražimo od Srbije da prizna Kosovo, Klix, 23.10.2014, https://www.klix.ba/
vijesti/regija/fule-ne-trazimo-od-srbije-da-prizna-kosovo/141023173 [07.10.2019]. See more on 
the topic: S. Gashi, I. Novaković, Od tehničkih sporazuma do sveobuhvatne normalizacije. Odnosi 
između Beograda i Prištine, Beograd 2017, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/13821.pdf 
[08.10.2019]; Kosovski Demokratski Institut, Dijalog Kosovo-Srbija: izazovi i dalji koraci, March 2018, 
http://kdi-kosova.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/18-Sfidat-SRB-04.pdf [08.10.2019].
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states and international cooperation was the only way to guarantee 
their continued activity. While the economic sphere was ruled by 
a spirit of pragmatism, diplomatic relations encountered more stum-
bling blocks, especially in Serbia, which emerged from the conflicts 
of the 1990s with heavy baggage that largely determined its internal 
affairs and foreign policy. The countries of the region, however, have 
shown goodwill in mutual diplomatic relations, motivated either by 
economic interest or, in the case of Serbia, the presence of a Serbian 
minority, with an important role played by external pressure relat-
ed to the accession process. Apart from the case of Kosovo, already 
discussed above, it is also important to draw attention to the thorny 
relations between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Al-
though the difficult process of relation-building has been underway 
for 20 years, its fragility still often comes to light, usually on occasions 
related to the war.
On account of its central location in the Balkan Peninsula, Serbia 
has always aspired to the role of regional hegemon, an important state 
to be reckoned with in regional politics. Because of the political re-
gime that isolated it on the international arena until 2000, it was not 
until the dawn of the 21st century that it could finally begin to build its 
position in the region. Currently, Serbia is a partner of most (if not all) 
regional initiatives designed to impact multi-level political and eco-
nomic stability in the area. In 2000, it joined the South-East European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP), aimed at strengthening regional coop-
eration, and the Central European Initiative (CEI), established to fund 
regional projects from the resources of its member states, which in-
cluded 10 EU countries, the countries of Western Balkans, and the so-
called European Neighbourhood (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova). In 
the same year that its political isolation ended, Serbia also joined the 
Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, composed of eight countries10 working 
together in the fields of tourism, culture, academic exchange, trans-
port and maritime cooperation, environmental protection, including 
fire safety, as well as partnerships between small and medium-sized 
10 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia.
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enterprises11. An important role in regional cooperation is also played 
by the question of the Danube and the Sava rivers. To regulate the is-
sue, in 2003, Serbia signed an agreement (‘Okvirni sporazum za sliv 
reke Save’, or OSSRS)12, which addressed the order of navigation, sus-
tainable water-management strategies, and the protection of the eco-
system and its waters from harmful impact. Serbia has also worked 
with other EU member countries within the framework of the ‘EU 
Strategy for the Danube Region’ (2011). The strategy is based on three 
basic pillars: 1. connectivity and communications; 2. environmental 
protection, risk prevention and sustainable use of natural resources; 
3. social, economic, and institutional development13.
In 2015, the Balkan Peninsula became the flashpoint of the refugee 
crisis, sparking the need for cooperation in yet another area. On a re-
gional scale, the countries of the Western Balkans had signed a spe-
cial agreement in 2004, based on the stabilisation pact of 2002. The 
Regional Initiative for Migration, Asylum and Refugees, which meets 
at least twice a year, addresses not only the challenges of asylum and 
migration flows but also border management, visa regimes, and the 
repatriation of displaced persons14.
In the economic sphere, after the proclamation of independence 
in 2006, Serbia became a party to CEFTA, a multilateral free trade 
agreement in Central and Eastern Europe15.
It should be noted that despite the complexities of the not so dis-
tant past, the countries of the Western Balkans and the peninsula at 
large generally support one another in their aspiration to join the EU. 
Formal support, for instance, is the objective of the Brdo-Brioni pro-
cess, initiated in 2010, which aims to foster a spirit of cooperation 
and strengthen the regional bonds between countries, as well as the 
Berlin Process, established by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 
2014, which represents the interests of the Western Balkan region as 
a whole. Another, more time-hallowed, initiative that encompasses the 
11 Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije, Regionalne inicijative, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/
index.php/spoljna-politika/eu/regionalna-saradnja?lang=lat [20.09.2019].
12 Ibidem. Other parties to this agreement are Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, 
and the Republic of Slovenia.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem.
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whole region is the Visegrad Group, which actively supports NGOs 
and individuals by granting subsidies, individual scholarships and or-
ganising art workshops to promote the exchange of ideas within the 
region and between involved countries. Regional cooperation is also 
promoted by the youngest institution, active since 2016, the Regional 
Youth Cooperation Office16.
4. EU accession process  and relations with the EU after 2012
As for the internal transformation of the Serbian state and its focus 
on integration with the EU, it should be pointed out that dynamic re-
forms and a clear acceleration in this respect, as mentioned before, 
could only be observed in the second decade of the 21st century, after 
the rise to power of the SNS. One could say that the first decade was 
a time of lost opportunities, untapped by the declaratively pro-Europe-
an ruling parties, symbolised by the former President Boris Tadić. As 
early as in June 2002, the European Council recognised Serbia (FRY) 
as a potential candidate for EU membership, a declaration confirmed 
three years later in Thessaloniki (considering that, in 2000, Serbia op-
timistically estimated it would be able to join the EU in 2004, this just 
went to show how slow the reforms had really advanced). However, 
it was not until 2004 that Serbia signed the SAA, which then took 
nine more years to come into force (2013). At long last, the country 
achieved official EU candidate status in 2012. In 2013, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution on Serbian development and decided 
to start official talks by January 2014. The plan materialised: the first 
intergovernmental conference took place in Brussels on 21 January 
2014, marking the formal launch of talks; later the same year, the Ser-
bian government submitted a ‘National Programme for the Adoption 
of the Acquis Communautaire’ for the 2014-2018 period. Then, at the 
end of the year, Brussels hosted a session of the Council for Stabilisa-
tion and Association17.
16 Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije, Regionalne inicijative…
17 Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Хронолошки преглед односа Републике 
Србије и Европске Уније од 2005. године до отваранја приступних преговора [Hronološki 
60
Yearbook of  the  Ins t i tu te  of  East-Centra l  Europe •  Volume 17  (2019)  •  I s sue 4
Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska
In March 2015, a meeting was held to finalise the process of a le-
gal compliance review, and in August, Serbian authorities appointed 
the members of the negotiating team. At the end of the year, the first 
two negotiation chapters were opened, concerning financial control 
(Chapter 32)18 and so-called ‘other issues’ (Chapter 35)19, which will 
include matters related to the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo20. 
Half a year later, in the middle of 2016, two further chapters were 
opened: judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapter 23)21, and justice, 
freedom and security (Chapter 24)22; followed, later the same year, 
by two more – public procurement (Chapter 5)23 and science and re-
search (Chapter 25)24. In 2017, a record was set for the number of new 
pregled odnosa Republike Srbije i Evropske Unije od 2005. godine do otvaranja pristupnih pregovora], 
http://kurs-pregovori.mei.gov.rs/?page=uvod [14.10.2019].
18 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за поглавље 32 Финансијски надзор 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Sr-
bije Evropskoj uniji za poglavlje 32 Finansijski nadzor], Beograd 2014, http:// www.mei.gov.rs/up-
load/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_ pozicije/pg32_pregovaracka_pozicija_srb.
pdf [13.10.2019]. 
19 Konferencija o pristupanju Evropsku Uniju, Приступни документ. Заједничка позиција Европске 
Уније. Поглавље 35 остала питања [Pristupni dokument. Zajednička pozicija Evropske Unije. 
Poglavlje 35 ostala pitanja], Brisel 2015, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_
pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pg35_zajednicka_pozicija_eu.pdf [13.10.2019].
20 Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije, Хронолошки преглед… [Hronološki 
pregled…].
21 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије у оквиру Међувладине 
конференције о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 23. „Правосуђе 
и основна права” [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije u okviru Međuvladine konferencije o pristu-
panju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 23. „Pravosuđe i osnovna prava”], Beograd 2016, 
http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pg_23_
pregovaracka_pozicija_srbije.pdf [13.10.2019].
22 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиције Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 25 „Наука и истраживање” 
[Pregovaračka pozicije Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije 
Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 25 „Nauka i istraživanje”], Beograd 2016, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/
documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pg_poglavlje_pg_25.pdf [13.10.2019].
23 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије ѕа међународну конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској Унији за проговорачко поглавље 5 – јавне набавке 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za međunarodnu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Sr-
bije Evropskoj Uniji za progovoračko poglavlje 5 – javne nabavke], Beograd 2016, http://www.mei.
gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pg_pozicija_pg_5.pdf 
[13.10.2019].
24 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиције Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 25… [Pregovaračka pozicije Re-
publike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 
25…].
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chapters, when a total of six were opened: enterprise and industrial 
policy (Chapter 20)25, education and culture (Chapter 26)26, intellec-
tual property law (Chapter 7)27, customs union (Chapter 29)28, com-
pany law (Chapter 6)29, and external relations (Chapter 30)30. In 2018, 
four more followed: fisheries (Chapter 13)31, financial and budgetary 
25 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 20 „Предузетништво 
и индустријска политика” [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju 
o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 20 „Preduzetništvo i industrijska politika”], 
Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_
pozicije/pregovaracka_pozicija_srbije_poglavlje_20.pdf [13.10.2019].
26 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 26 „Образовање и култура” 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Sr-
bije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 26 „Obrazovanje i kultura”], Beograd 2016, http://www.mei.gov.
rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pregovaracka_pozicija_sr-
bije_pg_26.pdf [13.10.2019].
27 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за поглавље 7 Право интелектуалне својине 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije 
Evropskoj uniji za poglavlje 7 Pravo intelektualne svojine], Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/up-
load/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/Republika_Srbija_Pregovaracko_
poglavlje_7_srpska_verzija.pdf [13.10.2019].
28 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за поглавље 29 „Царинска унија” [Pregovaračka 
pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za 
poglavlje 29 „Carinska unija”], Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristup-
ni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/Pregovaracka_pozicija_29_srpski_tekst_19062017_locked.
pdf [13.10.2019].
29 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Преговарачко поглавље 6 – „Право 
привредних друштава” [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenci-
ju o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Pregovaračko poglavlje 6 – „Pravo privrednih 
društava”], Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pre-
govaracke_pozicije/pregovaracka_pozicija_rs_pg_6.pdf [13.10.2019].
30 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Преговарачко поглавље 30 – Економски 
односи са иностранством [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenci-
ju o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Pregovaračko poglavlje 30 – Ekonomski odnosi 
sa inostranstvom], Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_prego-
vori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pregovaracka_pozicija_rs_pg_30.pdf [14.10.2019].
31 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачкa позицијa Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Преговарачко поглавље 13 – Рибарство 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije 
Evropskoj uniji za Pregovaračko poglavlje 13 – Ribarstvo], Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/
upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pg_pozicija_13.pdf [14.10.2019].
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provisions (Chapter 33)32, economic and monetary policy (Chap-
ter 17)33, and statistics (Chapter 18)34. The following year, marked by 
widespread social criticism of the Serbian government, as expressed 
in mass civil protests, only one chapter, concerning financial services 
(Chapter 9)35, was opened.
The Republic of Serbia embarked on accession talks in January 
2014 during the first intergovernmental conference, opening 17 out 
of 35 negotiation chapters in the next five years, two of which have 
since been temporarily shelved. Despite the internal situation in the 
country, Serbia has been applauded for its efforts and the pace of the 
accession process. In 2017, the 4th Meeting of the Council for Stabili-
sation and Association expressed its approval of Serbia’s involvement 
in fostering regional cooperation, the rule of law, as well as its pro-
gress in talks with Priština, which allowed it to open new negotiation 
chapters. At the same time, however, it called on the Serbian govern-
ment to intensify reforms to promote the rule of law and fundamen-
tal rights, ensure the autonomy of democratic institutions and public 
administration, strengthen the market economy, and improve the 
business environment. Regional cooperation, but above all dialogue 
32 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Преговарачко поглавље 33 – Финансијска 
и буџетска питања [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristu-
panju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Pregovaračko poglavlje 33 – Finansijska i budžetska pitanja], 
Beograd 2017, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_
pozicije/pg_pozicija_33.pdf [14.10.2019].
33 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 17 „Економска и монетарна 
политика” [Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju 
Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 17 „Ekonomska i monetarna politika”], Beograd 2018, 
http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/poz-
icija_pg_17.pdf [14.10.2019].
34 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 18 „Статистика” [Pregovaračka 
pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj uniji 
za Poglavlje 18 „Statistika”], Beograd 2018, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_
pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pozicija_pg_18.pdf [14.10.2019].
35 Vlada Republike Srbije, Преговарачка позиција Републике Србије за Међувладину конференцију 
о приступању Републике Србије Европској унији за Поглавље 9 „Финансијске услуге” 
[Pregovaračka pozicija Republike Srbije za Međuvladinu konferenciju o pristupanju Republike Sr-
bije Evropskoj uniji za Poglavlje 9 „Finansijske usluge”], Beograd 2018, http://www.mei.gov.rs/up-
load/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracke_pozicije/pregovaracka_pozicija_PG_9.pdf 
[14.10.2019].
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with Priština, aimed at the ‘normalisation of relations with Kosovo’ 
was a formula that often cropped up in reports and summaries. The 
enigmatic phrase about the normalisation of relations is important 
to consider; defined as ‘of key importance to the overall rate of pro-
gress’ in the negotiations, it might go to confirm the tacit expectation 
that Serbia should recognise the independence of Kosovo, as already 
mentioned above36.
 The assessment of the Serbian transformation progress in 2018 was 
no longer as favourable. This had to do with the deteriorating internal 
situation and the gradual shift from democracy toward the Hungar-
ian political model (more below), accompanied by increasing social 
unrest. Reforms in the most important areas (chapters 23 and 24: the 
judicial system, fundamental rights and security, but above all, im-
portant legal provisions concerning the funding of political activi-
ties, public procurement, the fight against corruption and free access 
to information37), were judged as not sufficiently effective. The over-
all assessment, issued by the European Policy Centre, was a ‘solid C’ 
and the progress of reforms was described as noticeable. In view of 
the Freedom House ranking, published just four months later, also 
discussed below, this ‘solid C’ was still too high, considering that the 
measures of the Serbian government were described by the European 
Policy Centre as ‘one of the least transparent... in the region’38.
The 10th ministerial conference, which opened a new negotiation 
chapter (Chapter 9, devoted to financial services39), took place in June 
2019. Subsequent conferences were planned for the second half of the 
year but have not yet been held. Compared to previous years, the pace 
of the accession process in Serbia has clearly slowed, hampered by the 
rising criticism of the current government, more vocal (and more per-
36 Council of the European Union, Fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council be-
tween the European Union and Serbia, 16.11.2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/
press-releases/2017/11/16/fourth-meeting-of-the-stabilisation-and-association-council-between-
the-european-union-and-serbia/ [13.10.2019].
37 Part 24 also includes the intimidation of and physical violence against journalists.
38 V. Popović, Srbiji solidna trojka za ostvarivanje poglavlja 23 i 24, VOA, 20.12.2018, https://www.gla-
samerike.net/a/srbiji-solidna-trojka-za-ostvarivanje-poglavlja-23-i-24/4709631.html [14.10.2019].
39 European Council, Council of the European Union, Tenth meeting of the Accession Conference 
with Serbia at Ministerial level, Brussels, 27 June 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/
press-releases/2019/06/27/tenth-meeting-of-the-accession-conference-with-serbia-at-ministe-
rial-level-brussels-27-june-2019/ [13.10.2019].
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sistent) on the part of Serbian society than the EU. Important charges 
levelled by Serbian social activists were to a certain extent reflected in 
a report on the accession progress, focused on specific areas, which 
was published at the end of May 2019. With respect to politics, the 
report emphasizes the need to create more space for genuine cross-
party debate in order to forge a broad pro-European consensus and 
mentions the parliamentary boycott introduced by some parties at 
the beginning of 2019, which has significantly limited the dialogue in 
question. The ruling coalition’s parliamentary practices, the report 
claims, have undermined parliament’s oversight of the executive. Its 
tendency to take anti-democratic measures, in turn, has led to weekly 
civil protests against infringements of media freedom, manipulation 
and attempts to influence free and transparent elections, as reported 
by international observers40.
Another issue concerns the area of public administration, which, 
according to the report, has not been adequately reformed. Especially 
alarming is the political pressure on high-ranking executive staff. The 
report also indicated the need to recruit and retain qualified personnel 
to deal with matters related to the accession process and a coordinated 
monitoring and reporting system for public administration reform, as 
well as public finance reform and its management41.
The report favourably assessed reforms undertaken in the judi-
cial system, pointing out that Serbia has made ‘limited’ progress and 
achieved ‘some’ level of preparation, following the guidelines only in 
part. However, it also mentioned that the process of constitutional 
reform intended to align the constitution with European judiciary 
standards is still ongoing. The areas in need of reform, according to 
the report, include the system of appointing and evaluating judges 
and prosecutors, which should rely on merit-based criteria. A special 
point of interest is the degree of political influence on the courts42.
40 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, Ključni zaključci izveštaja o Srbiji 
za 2019. godinu, 29.05.2019, http://europa.rs/kljucni-zakljucci-izvestaja-o-srbiji-za-2019-godinu/ 
[15.10.2019]; European Commission, Serbia 2019 Report, Brussels, 29.05.2019, https://ec.europa.
eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf [15.10.2019].
41 Ibidem.
42 Ibidem.
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Another issue discussed in the report was the fight against cor-
ruption, which the Serbian government has waged only ‘to a limited 
extent’. The report mentioned the laws introduced in this respect in 
2018 and 2019, but pointed to the lack of their measurable impact, 
due to the short time that has elapsed since their introduction. The 
area was judged as particularly sensitive and in need of scrupulous re-
view on account of the widespread corruption at the top state level, 
which may make it more difficult to prosecute crimes and issue im-
partial verdicts in such cases. The same holds for organised crime, as 
Serbia only shows ‘some level of preparation’ to combat the problem. 
A new chapter of the criminal code dealing with economic crime was 
only being implemented when the report was published, as was a new 
strategy for fighting organised crime (2019-2023), based on advanced 
technologies; at the same time, no progress had been made to meet 
the recommendations of the previous report43.
Another area that has received a broad legal framework but failed 
to be enforced, altogether or in part, included the issue of fundamen-
tal rights, including minority rights. The report applauded the new 
media strategy blueprint but expressed concern over its exclusively 
literal and declarative character. No real progress has been made, the 
report claims, to guarantee the freedom of speech and the rights of 
discriminated persons (the LGBT community, people with disabili-
ties, HIV/AIDS patients, etc.)44.
On a political level, however, the report praised the Serbian gov-
ernment for its involvement in regional cooperation and progress in 
the ongoing dialogue with Priština. It also applauded Serbian efforts to 
stabilise migration flows to the EU. The country has made significant 
advances in the implementation of an integrated border management 
strategy and adopted a plan to prevent illegal migration45.
In economic terms, Serbia merited a fair assessment. The posi-
tive phenomena included some degree of preparation to develop an 
43 According to the report, there were no registers of effective investigations, indictments or final 
convictions (their number was defined as small in the document) in cases concerning organised 
crime, including financial investigations, which could lead to recording confiscation of proceeds 
from crime. See Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, Ključni zaključci…
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem.
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efficient market economy, improvements in debt sustainability and 
the financial sector. Positive advancements were also observed in the 
labour market (except with regard to the young). The negatives in-
cluded external imbalances and their financing, the persistent, high 
inflation, the slow pace of structural reform in public administration, 
fiscal administration and public enterprise, which continue to slow 
down the progress of reforms, as well as the lack of sufficient invest-
ment. Excessive state intervention also was deemed a problem, ac-
companied by an underdeveloped private sector, insufficient efforts 
to ensure fair competition and a weak rule of law that serves to re-
inforce these trends. On the other hand, legislative reforms aimed at 
ensuring compliance with EU standards were assessed positively, even 
though further progress is still required, especially in areas such as 
public procurement, statistics, foreign relations, social and employ-
ment policy, monetary policy, financial services and environmental 
protection. Priority areas in urgent need of speedy reform included 
state control, fiscal discrimination on alcohol, and the limited com-
petition in card payment systems46.
5. Challenges to Serbian democracy  in an era of populism
Serbia falls in with the pan-European trend of the renascent popularity 
of the right-wing, tinged with the specific flavour of Central Europe, 
and the rise of right-wing populists promising real change, which, as 
shown by the election results, seems more important to voters than 
the ruling party’s attempts to limit democracy. Political parties have 
now changed into organisations that mine public resources through 
corruptible officials, often mere dilettantes with no qualifications to 
hold a post in public administration, state institutions or enterprises 
(a similar phenomenon is also underway in Poland, where critics in-
terpret the exorbitant salaries claimed by such individuals, on top of 
their self-awarded bonuses and tax breaks, as a form of compensa-
tion for their long wait to get into power). Favouritism is widespread; 
lucrative jobs are handed out to the followers of the ruling party or 
46 Ibidem.
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the president. The same trend plagues not only Serbia but also oth-
er Central European countries (Hungary being an excellent case in 
point), and while in the first two decades after the fall of communism 
this did not seem so glaring, in the 2010s, the practice is no longer 
as discreet. It fits in, however, with the widescale acceptance of com-
mercial populism; society openly condones such conduct because of 
the accompanying changes in the distribution of various subsidies, 
e.g., in the form of welfare. The government boosts the living condi-
tions and the citizens, who appreciate the improvement, turn a blind 
eye to its deviation from democratic principles and the rule of law. In 
Serbia, however, the high level of support enjoyed by the ruling party 
may have to do not so much with the improvements in the quality of 
life as with the actual reforms that the SNS implemented after 2012, 
and for which the Serbs had waited for more than a decade. Add to 
that the political course for the West (including the acceptance of EU 
values) and it is plain to see why Vučić and his party, with such long-
standing nationalist and right-wing traditions, should continue to en-
joy a broad capital of social trust; its supporters believe that despite 
the new political and economic policy, Vučić will still stand guard 
over Serbian national interests (while the predecessors of the presi-
dent and his party in the first decade of the 21st century also spoke in 
defence of the national interest, their declarations again never went 
beyond lip-service).
Vučić’s political opponents argue that for the West, which has 
placed more trust in the president than in any other Serbian politi-
cian, free media, fair elections, human rights and democratic liberties 
are essentially far less important than an agreement between Belgrade 
and Priština; this is backed by Western diplomats themselves, who 
point out that as long as Vučić and his team are in power, talks be-
tween Belgrade and Priština are guaranteed to continue47. This situa-
tion mirrors the events of 1996/1997 when the opponents of Milošević 
took to the streets to protest against rigged local elections. Not unlike 
now, the opposition, which closed ranks to stage the protests, failed 
to attract Western support (despite the efforts of the Serbian Prime 
47 M. Stojanović, Zapad podržava Vučicia zbog kosovskog pitanja, Danas, 05.03.2019, https://www.
danas.rs/politika/zapad-podrzava-vucica-zbog-kosovskog-pitanja/ [09.06.2019].
68
Yearbook of  the  Ins t i tu te  of  East-Centra l  Europe •  Volume 17  (2019)  •  I s sue 4
Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska
Minister-to-be and Democratic Party leader, Zoran Đinđić). The rea-
son was that the West did not quite know what policies to expect of 
the opposition, unlike the already well-known Milošević and his par-
ty48. The same holds true today: the team of Vučić, who have waged 
an effective political offensive since 2015 on a scale unprecedented in 
the history of Serbia, have managed to build up a favourable PR im-
age both in Eastern and Western Europe. For this reason, not unlike 
22 years ago, when the West argued that the Serbian opposition was 
more nationalist in attitude than the then-steward of Serbia, today, 
the image of the Serbian president and his government is also more 
moderate than that of some parties in the Alliance for Serbia (which 
includes the likes of the right-wing, Eurosceptic, conservative and na-
tionalist Dveri, Fatherland, or Healthy Serbia, the last of which is not 
represented in parliament at the moment)49.
This phenomenon has been addressed and publicly lambasted by 
the opponents of the ruling party, but the problem in Serbia, not un-
like in Poland, is that there is no real political alternative to the sta-
tus quo. The weakness of the Serbian opposition lies in the fact that 
some of its parties were already in power before 2012, demonstrating 
a complete lack of transformative ability and failing to introduce any 
real reforms for a decade. The pro-European parties of the opposition 
base their programme on neoliberal dogma and have no real grounds 
to question the policies enforced by Vučić, such as the market econ-
omy or integration with the EU. This allows the government to claim 
that the opposition has no independent political programme and that 
its attacks on the president are motivated by mere personal aversion. 
The anti-European and nationalist wing of the opposition, on the other 
hand, is ‘trapped in the national problem, with eyes set on the king-
dom of heaven and can see nothing else beyond’50.
48 For more, see M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, Serbia pod rządami Slobodana Miloševicia. Serbska 
polityka wobec rozpadu Jugosławii w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX w., Kraków 2008, p. 195 and 
next.
49 Данас Запад подржава Вучића ѕбог Косова, у Савез за Србију немају поверења [Danas Zapad 
podržava Vučića zbog Kosova, u Savez za Srbiju nemaju poverenja], Nova srpska politička misao, 
05.03.2019, http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/danas-zapad-podrzava-vucica-zbog-kosova-u-savez-
za-srbiju-nemaju-povorenja.html [14.10.2019].
50 M. Samardžić, Šetnje nisu dovoljne – organizacija i program kao Arhimedova tačka i/ili Ahilo-
va peta, Nova srpska politička misao, 14.01.2019, http://www.nspm.rs/kuda-ide-srbija/
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Importantly, the opposition in Serbia is too diverse to come up 
with a programme that would be competitive and attractive enough 
to rival that of the SNS and guarantee electoral victory. Another thing 
is the issue of actually delivering on electoral promises, where we see 
another analogy with the social and political context in Poland. As 
long as they do not affect everyday life directly, legal violations and 
the breach of democratic principles of law are not perceived as a prob-
lem by the average citizen; they pale in contrast with the dynamism 
of change that, together with the implementation of the party’s pro-
gramme, shows the government as one that reckons with its citizens 
and delivers on their expectations. The opposition faces the political 
challenge of building a coherent and credible image of a coalition that 
brings together Eurosceptic, nationalist conservatives on the one hand, 
and pro-European, left-wing social democrats on the other. The ex-
ample of Serbia, not unlike that of Poland or Hungary, demonstrates 
the failure of an opposition alliance whose only shared postulate is to 
abolish the incumbent government by exposing its flaws (corruption, 
favouritism, connections to the previous regime, shady business deals 
or embarrassing verbal blunders that lay bare their dilettantism and 
low qualifications) is not effective.
The lack of an effective political opposition in Serbia has mobilised 
citizens to take to the streets to demonstrate against the government. 
Protest leaders accuse the president of failing to engage in dialogue 
with the citizens. However, analysts view these spontaneous protests 
as a civic movement, likely to soon lose momentum and fizzle out 
without achieving any tangible change, which could come through 
a more effective, structured political movement, running on an anti-
system ticket51. In recent months, associations have mushroomed to 
unite individuals dissatisfied with the rule of Vučić and his team. The 
most popular among these, One in Five Million, established at the 
end of January 201952, aims to give systematic form to the postulates 
setnje-nisu-dovoljne-organizacija-i-program-kao-arhimedova-tacka-i/ili-ahilova-peta.
html?alphabet=l#yvComment209241 [10.06.2019].
51 The problem, however, is that any activity that takes the form of a party and activists’ contact 
with politics is perceived automatically as entering the world of clientelism and corruption and 
thereby losing credibility. See M. Samardžić, Šetnje nisu dovoljne…
52 U Beogradu osnovano Udruženje “1 od 5 miliona”, Danas, 27.02.2019, https://www.danas.rs/poli-
tika/osnovano-udruzenje-1-od-5-miliona/ [10.06.2019].
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made by the protesters and engage in dialogue with the authorities, 
who have thus far completely ignored and played down their activi-
ties since December 2018.
Methods employed by the authorities against the demonstrators, 
but also the opposition at large, are designed to denigrate them in 
the eyes of the public (or potential voters); similar strategies can be 
observed in Poland and Hungary. The most basic of these is the at-
tempt to revile an opponent: in Serbia, protesters are labelled as Al-
banian lobbyists, in Poland as the ‘worse sort’, and in both countries, 
condemned as ‘traitors to the fatherland’. The scale and importance of 
the protests are also routinely played down, or protesters are cast as 
the supporters of or even direct agents of external powers, in Serbia, 
described as foreign-sponsored, and in Poland, on the payroll of the 
former communist regime (the so-called ‘red rabble’). In contrast to 
Serbia, however, in Poland most of the struggle is verbal: violence only 
occasionally erupts between different groups of protesters; sometimes 
effigies are publicly burned. The only exception was the assassination of 
the mayor of Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz, known for his liberal ideas, 
which the authorities still refuse to treat as politically motivated, even 
though the killer himself admitted he was driven by his hatred of the 
opposition, as represented by the mayor. In Serbia, there has been an 
ongoing campaign of intimidation and acts of violence against protest-
ers and opposition politicians are the order of the day (e.g., spraying 
water, throwing petards into the crowd). The opposition’s calls for dia-
logue are persistently ignored by the authorities (in Poland and Serbia 
alike), set on promoting the propaganda of success, which cannot be 
hindered by a mere ‘handful’ of dissatisfied protesters53.
The establishment casts civil protests as a token of democracy (af-
ter all, people are allowed to air their grievances), but definitely not as 
a revolution or a broader ‘Balkan Spring’ (including not only protests in 
Serbia but also in Albania and Montenegro)54, which could have a real 
impact on reforms, because in its eyes, as mentioned before, it does not 
53 S. Čongradin, Anasonović: Pauza za Uskrs nije opcija, Danas, 26.04.2019, https://www.danas.rs/
politika/anasonovic-pauza-za-uskrs-nije-opcija/ [10.06.2019].
54 See V. Pešić, Slobodna volja za miting, moć za kontramiting, Peščanik, 23.04.2019, https://pescanik.
net/slobodna-volja-za-miting-moc-za-kontramiting/ [14.10.2019]; V. Gligorov, Brojevi, Peščanik, 
01.05.2019, https://pescanik.net/brojevi/ [14.10.2019].
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represent the majority view. The establishment relativizes the causes 
of protest and plays down the numbers of protesters to show that nei-
ther the demonstrators nor their postulates enjoy broader social sup-
port. Extended over a period of time, protests in Serbia, such as those 
of 1996/1997, have always shown a variable dynamic and a tendency 
for social involvement to wane over time; the government probably 
hopes that the current demonstrations will likewise finally fizzle out.
6. ConclusionThirty years after the fall of communism, Serbs, not unlike other 
Eastern European nations, especially Poland and Hungary, two theo-
retical examples of successful transformation in previous decades, are 
still waiting for effective reforms to patch up the national economy, 
improve living conditions and put Serbia on an equal footing with, if 
not the strongest EU member states, then at least the countries of the 
region, some of which already enjoy EU membership. In their eyes, 
this objective can be achieved even at the expense of abandoning the 
principles of democracy, which seem to have recently lost currency, as 
evidenced by the case of Poland, Hungary, and now Serbia, with par-
liamentary elections after 2012 (in Poland and Hungary, also the Eu-
ropean Parliament elections in 2019). Even though there has long been 
talk of a resurgent wave of right-wing movements and their popularity 
throughout Europe, in the West, the phenomenon underway occurs 
under the conditions of stable democracy; in Central Europe and the 
Balkans, however, it simply undermines the relatively recent demo-
cratic gains, often not very well established, for the sake of improving 
the financial situation of the state and its citizens. Protesters in Ser-
bia, both opposition politicians and social activists, should focus on 
deeper social grievances, rather than democracy and free media alone, 
as these arguments have been shown to fail in the struggle against the 
ruling power. To convince the unconvinced, the weakness of the state 
should be exposed in areas that more closely affect the people, such 
as workers’ rights or the disastrous state of public healthcare. This is 
where analysts see good potential for effective opposition.
Vučić seems to be the first Serbian politician after 2000 (apart from 
Đinđic), who truly wants to talk to and cooperate with Western Eu-
rope effectively, who started the process of real and dynamic change 
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in Serbia, which is also perceived by society; who started an effective 
dialogue with Priština, and who clearly declares a pro-EU direction of 
the Serbian state, even at the expense of Moscow’s loss of confidence55. 
The EU trusts him as an effective politician with whom common goals 
can be achieved. Another issue that seems not to interest EU politi-
cians is Serbia’s internal situation56, ruled by a narrow party elite in 
a way now defined as ‘stabilocracy’ (an amalgam of ‘stabilisation’ and 
‘autocracy’). The fact is that the paths leading to integration and the 
authoritarian turn of the state will have to cross at some point. The 
question is whether there will be a moment at which this authoritari-
anism has gone so far that it will close Serbia’s door to the EU at last, 
or will it come after accession when EU standards will require Vučić 
to democratise the state?
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